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Executive Pardons
Long before the State arose from its couch, in the
morning twilight of history, while the first streaks of the
light of law and justice were driving back the inky dark-
ness of cruelty and oppression, mercy, pity and compassion
became evident in the human breast and sought expression,
as well in the conduct of individuals, as in that of new born
nations. As kingdoms grew and developed in the blazing
sunshine of a new day-a day of organized civilization-so
this feeling of mercy towards those who had transgressed
grew and expanded; as fundamental principles of human
rights and relations were given practical expression in le-
gal codes, so there gradually was conceived a practice that
was ultra vires and was founded upon more beautiful
premises than the mere letter of the law. Through all the
history of the human race, like the scarlet thread that runs
through all the cordage of the British Navy, runs the doc-
trine of mercy and forgiveness, of remission for infrac-
tions of the law. Poets have sung its praises, dramatists
have woven it into their themes and religious leaders have
taught its application. The Greatest of Teachers said, "The
letter of the law killeth, but the Spirit giveth eternal life,"
and just so where the letter of the law demanded the ex-
treme penalty, this spirit above the law has given life again.
Shakespeare feels its universality and expansiveness when
he makes one of his characters say
"The quality of mercy is not strained
It droppeth as the gentle rain upon the earth beneath."
If we read Blackstone and his contemporaries, we
learn of hundreds of offenses--oftimes trivial in character-
for which the penalty was death, and not only that, but in
addition, the lands and property of the criminal were for-
feited to the Crown. From this rigorous application of the
law there was no appeal or relief-it was inflexible and in-
exorable. The idea of mercy and forgiveness found its ex-
pression in the act of the king in pardoning the offense and
remitting or sending back the property of the offender.
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Clearly, the king could give back that which by law was
his; but just as clearly the king could not give back that in
which any subject had an interest or right of ownership.
In the development of the common law the principle be-
came well established that a pardon could discharge the
king's moiety or part, but not that in which a subject had
a vested interest, while the remission of forfeiture to the
king and the pardoning of offenders by the Crown came to
be recognized as one of the inherent and natural rights of
the sovereign.
It was only natural, therefore, that the charter to Wil-
liam Penn from King Charles should make some reference
to the former's power as sovereign of "Penn's Woods" to
exercise this right of clemency or pardon. The charter
expressly provides "* * * power to him, his heirs, dep-
uties and lieutenants to remit, release, pardon and- abolish
(whether before judgment or after) all crimes and offenses
whatsoever committed against the laws, treason and wilful
and malicious murder only excepted, and in those cases to
grant reprieves until the king's pleasure might be known
therein".
The Constitution of 1776 imitated this provision in the
Charter, but substituted the Legislature for the King,
granting power to remit fines and grant pardons in all cases
whatsoever except impeachment, and in case of murder and
treason to grant reprieves until the next session of the Gen-
eral Assembly. Under this Constitution it was lawful for
the Executive Council to grant a pardon on the condition
the person should, within a limited time, depart from the
United States, and on departing or returning, the par-
don to be void. It appears this is the first instance in this
state in which pardons may be granted on condition, even
though such pardon amounts to banishment or expatria-
tion1. By the Constitution of 1790 all restrictions of the
power to pardon were removed and it was given to the ex-
ecutive freely and fully, and this was not altered by the
Constitution of 1836 nor that of 18732.
iFlavell's Case, 8 W. & S. 197.
2Constitution of 1873, sec. 89,1 Purdon's statutes 171.
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No general principle of law is more firmly grounded
than that which fixes common law interpretations and
definitions upon words and phrases that the Acts of General
Assembly, judicial opinions and common usage have not
altered in meaning. By common law there are some acts
of such a character that a condition subsequent cannot be
attached because of repugnancy to the act done. The dis-
tinction is made by Coke, who says that an express manu-
mission of a villein cannot be on condition, because once
free, he is forever free. But that the king may make a
pardon to a man of his life upon condition is a doctrine
that is followed by Blackstone, Hawkins, Chitty and others
and this has come to have general recognition. The con-
clusion follows, that a pardon at common law may be upon
any condition and that, there being an absence of statutory
provision to the contrary, it may have the same effect in
Pennsylvania. If the Governor sees fit to annex any condi-
tion, either precedent or subsequent, to a pardon before it
becomes effective, it lies on the donee to fulfill that condi-
tion. If he does not fulfill the condition precedent, then the
pardon never takes effect; but if he fails to observe the con-
dition subsequent, then the pardon becomes null and void
and the original sentence remains in full force and vigor3.
From the historical aspects of a pardon it is apparent
that the Governor stands practically in the same position
as the king in an earlier day and that except where statutes
have specifically .altered his power, the chief executive can
do no more than the king could do under the common law.
While some would try to read into the grant of power to
the Executive to issue pardons an unlimited authority to
commute terms of imprisonment and remit fines and penal-
ties, yet this is not the correct conception of the law as
enunciated by the Courts.
One of the earliest cases involving the legal effect of a
pardon was that brought by Matthew Duncan, of Franklin
County, who was convicted of adultery and bastardy. He
pleaded the pardon, and this was allowed, but judgment
8Flavell's Case, 8 W. & S. 197.
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nevertheless was entered against him for the costs and an
order was entered providing for payments for the support
of the children who were the product of his crime. The
contention was that the pardon being full and complete for
the crime of adultery, no judgment could be entered against
him. The Court, however, raised the distinction that in
cases in which the crime may be divided into distinct parts
there may be a pardon for the one without there being any
effect upon the other. There is a wide difference between
punishment for adultery and maintenance of the child born
as the result of that crime; the one is punitive, the other
to enforce a moral duty and save public expense. There
may be propriety in remitting the punishment and at the
same time enforcing the order for maintenance'.
This case, however, lays down a broad and plain pro-
nouncement concerning the costs involved. The Common-
wealth contended that the costs were vested in certain of-
ficers to whom they were due and that not even the power
of the Governor could interfere with the payment of these.
The distinction was made that had the pardon been pleaded
before judgment, then the costs would have been remitted.
The time that the right to the costs vests in the officers of
the law is the time of imposition of sentence; the pleading
of a pardon after that time can have no effect on the costs.
Justice Tilghman, speaking for the Court, says, "Costs for
which judgment has been given are not remitted by a par-
don of the offense subsequent to the judgment, because
there was a vested interest in private persons." It is clear
that this interpretation finds its roots back in the principles
of the common law which permitted the king to remit his
moiety or part, but not the part of his subjects. If the
Governor is considered to be in the same position as the
king respecting pardons, the conclusion of the court is
logical and natural in its ruling respecting costs. Again,
the Supreme Court lays down the general rule that the
costs in a criminal proceeding are the property of the sev-
eral officers to whom payable and cannot be remitted by
'Duncan v. Commonwealth, 4 S. &. R. 449.
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the Governor, who can only absolve from imprisonment for
the offense".
A distinction seems to be drawn, however, between the
granting of a pardon after judgment has been entered and
the pleading of a pardon before judgment. In the former
instance the right to the costs has vested and cannot be
disturbed by the pardon. Ina Fayette County case the de-
fendant was found guilty of assault and battery and a
month before imposition of sentence was pardoned by the
Governor. The pardon was duly filed in Court, but sen-
tence was nevertheless entered against the defendant for
the costs. This case seems to go a step farther than that of
Duncan v. Commonwealth in that it holds the right of the
officers to the costs vests after the verdict and before judg-
ment is entered and sentence passed6 .
In the case of Commonwealth v. DunnistonT the defendant
entered into a recognizance in the sum of $2000 conditioned
for the appearance of a person charged with larceny. The
recognizance was forfeited and after suit was brought judg-
ment was entered. The Governor promptly remitted the
forfeiture and a case stated was brought to determine the
right of the Executive to remit such forfeiture. As in the
matter of costs the sole question is whether the right to
the money secured by the recognizance is a vested one and
this the Court answers by holding that the county has no
more vested right than the state would have and as the
state occupying the position of sovereign could remit fines
and forfeitures, so the Governor could remit the forfeited
recognizance. By the provisions of the Constitution the
Governor has the right to remit fines and forfeitures, grant
reprieves and pardons, except in cases of impeachment, and
that power even the Legislature cannot abridge or destroy.
Fines are payable to the Commissioners of the respective
counties and it is the duty of the latter to collect them and
apply them to general county purposes. But until the
money is actually collected and in the treasury the Gover-
5Ex parte McDonald, 2 Wharton, 440.
*Playford v. Conmonwealth, 4 Pa. 144.
7Commonwealth v. Dunniston, 9 Wharton, 142.
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nor has power to pardon the offender and remit the fine and
forfeiture. The right to remit cannot be affected because
judgment was taken on the recognizance, as it would indeed
be a false distinction to give the Governor the right to par-
don for the prison term and deny him the right to remit the
fines and forfeitures. While it is true that in the case of
costs the right of private persons is at stake, this is not
true as regards fines and forfeitures. These are purely
matters of public policy under the exclusive control of the
Governor and the Legislature cannot interfere with these
constitutional rights."
There must be special words of restitution used in the
pardon in order to divest the county of its right to the fine
and to remit this to the defendant. It has been held under
the common law that a vested interest in the king was not
divested and remitted by a general act of pardon unless
there were used clearly words of restitution. There is a
vested right arising out of the commission of an offense and
sentence therefor and this cannot be affected by a pardon
from the Governor any more than a pardon by the king.
From the moment of sentence the right to the fine was
vested in the county and while the Governor might have
remitted it by express words, yet it is not affected by a
general act of pardon. In respect to the fine, the county
stands in the place of the Commonwealth and the Gov-
ernor may remit just as fully as if it were to be paid to the
state treasury. While it is not at all easy to reconcile all
the decisions regarding pardons, yet the discharge of a pris-
oner who has received a general pardon without a specific
remission of the fine and without payment thereof will
make the sheriff liable to the county in an action on his
bond"0 .
It is admitted that the execution of a deed of convey-
ance for real estate without delivery thereof to the grantee
passes no title. Just so the delivery of the pardon to the
donee is essential to give him any right to release. The
sCommonwealth v. Dunniston 9 Wharton, 142.9Cope v. Commonwealth, 28 Pa. 297.
10Cope v. Commonwealth, 28 Pa. 297.
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mere intention to grant a pardon can have no legal force
until the completed act, which is when the pardon is finally
delivered"'. This is the only step that gives title to a par-
don and the subsequent release of the offender. By loose
practice a pardon has come to be considerd a mere voucher
issued to the warden or sheriff for the delivery of a pris-
oner, but viewed in its proper light it is the prisoner's title
to his freedom. While it is true that delivery to the war-
den of the penitentiary is prima facie evidence of delivery
to the prisoner, yet it is only constructive delivery and may
be rebutted. For example, a pardon issued by the Governor
on the request of the War Department that the prisoner
was needed for special military service, when it was found
that the letters from the War Department were forgeries,
was voided and the prisoner required to serve his term.
Despite the fact that he had been actually taken from the
custody of the warden yet he was. ordered returned and his
pardon voided because of the fraud practiced in securing
the pardon.
A pardon is an act of grace on the part of the Chief
Executive standing in the place of the sovereign or king
and is not a matter of merit. If forgery and fraud in se-
curing a pardon will act to void it and cause the recommit-
ment of the prisoner 12, counsel for any petitioner for a par-
don must be cautious not to make extravagant statements
and false averments in presenting and pressing such appli-
cation. The highest good faith required by law must char-
acterize certain relations and surely in representing a client
before the Pardon Board nothing less than the highest good
faith should be used. While it is almost asking too much
to require the pardoning authorities to check and investi-
gate every averment of counsel for the petitioner, yet this
should not be necessary if the Bar is alert to its obligations.
It ought not to be the aim to secure the release of any
prisoner on any representations whatever, but rather should
it be to present meritorious cases for consideration. If the
authorities in this state are strictly observed any misrepre-
"lCommonwealth ex rel. v. Halloway, 44 Pa. 210.
12Commonwealth ex rel. v. Halloway, 44 Pa. 210,
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
sentation or fraud practiced to secure the pardon of a pris-
oner would void that pardon per se.
The question has been raised in cases in which one-
half the fine imposed is payable to the county and one-half
is payable to the informer, whether the fine may be remit-
ted by the Governor 8 . The latter has the power under the
Constitution to remit "fines and forfeitures" and if such a
fine comes within the meaning of the Constitution, then it
may be remitted. Applying the analogy that the Governor
is in the same position as the king was formerly, we must
draw the conclusion that only those fines which were orig-
inally payable to the state may be remitted. Though sub-
sequent legislation may give a portion of such fine to the
informer, the Governor's power under the Constitution to
remit is unimpaired. All the old authorities confirm the
rule that the king could remit only his moiety of the fine
and, applying this rule, the Court reaches the conclusion
that the informer has a vested interest in one-half the fine
and that this cannot be remitted by a general pardon.
An affirmance of the doctrine that the defendant is
absolved from the costs only if the pardon issues before
sentence is imposed and judgment entered is found in Com-
monwealth v. Hitchman et al4 .
When a pardon is issued after sentence has been passed
and the defendant thereby is absolved from all punishment
but costs, the prisoner may be held until discharged by the
County Commissioners under the provisions of the insolv-
ent laws 15. In a Schuylkill County case, which was an
amicable action to determine the liability of the sheriff for
costs when he discharged such a prisoner without the con-
sent of the Commissioners, it was decided that there is no
power whatever in wardens or sheriffs to discharge with-
out the payment of costs-unless ordered to do so by the
Commissioners. Deibert was sentenced to a fine, the costs
and a term of six years in jail. He was discharged by the
warden without paying the costs and without the consent
asShoop v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. 126.
14Commonwealth v. Hitchman, 46 Pa. 357.
15County of Schuylkill v. Reifsnyder, 46 Pa. 446.
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of the County Commissioners. The warden justified his
action by the fact that a pardon had been issued to the
prisoner. The Court held that the fine, which was formerly
payable to the State and now was payable to the county as
a substitute, could be remitted by the Governor; that the
term of imprisonment could be nullified by the pardon; but
that the costs were vested in the officers to whom they
were payable and that the warden erred in discharging the
prisoner.
Originally the investigation of applications for pardons
rested entirely with the Executive, but all too soon with
increasing population this became a real burden to a busy
Governor charged with the business of a great Common-
wealth. An Act of General Assembly created the Pardon
Board and vested it with certain powers to investigate ap-
plications, hear arguments and make recommendations to
the Governor. While the pardon power remains vested
absolutely in the Executive, yet its practical application
rests on the recommendations of this Board, which is com-
posed of the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, the Attorney General and the Secretary for
Internal Affairs 6 .
That these recommendations of the Pardon Board are
in no way obligatory on the Governor is a finding of the
Supreme Court brought out in Commonwealth ex rel v. Mc-
Kenty17. This case questioned the constitutionality of the
Act of Assembly of May 10, 1909, P.L. 459, commonly
known as the Ludlow Act providing for indeterminate
prison terms and release after the ininimum term had been
served.
The question was raised that under this Act no legal
sentence could be passed as it vested judicial powers,
namely, those of parole, in a non-judicial board by giving
it the right to determine the length of sentence. This ob-
jection was held not valid, the Court stating that the Legis-
lature may define a crime and fix the punishment therefor,
while the Executive is invested with certain powers of grace
16Act of June 19, 1911, P. L 1055, sec. 15.
UCommonwealth v. McKenty, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 332.
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and pardon. This power of pardon is, as before stated, in-
herent in the Commonwealth. but by law is vested in and
delegated to the Governor. He may exercise the power of
grace and pardon in isolated cases, but the Legislature
quite properly may pass general acts of mercy, which in
effect alter and change the whole scheme of punishment for
crime. The power of mercy and pardon is not inherent in
the courts, and when the Legislature provided for indeter-
minate sentences, it fixed the specific maximum for each
crime, leaving the courts free, however, to exercise merciful
principles in determining how brief a term of imprisonment
was deemed proper.
The manner of bringing an application for a pardon to
the attention of the Governor is not a devious one. Printed
forms and instructions are provided any attorney by the
Pardon Board and in addition a printed schedule of cases
for argument is issued. The arguments themselves are
rather informal and may or may not be contested or op-
posed. After argument all the papers in the case, including
a certified copy of the exact sentence imposed, proof of
newspaper advertisement and any other pertinent docu-
ments are considered by the Board in executive session.
Recommendations for pardon or clemency are made to the
Governor, notice of all such being given to counsel con-
cerned, and the actual pardons are then issued from the
Governor's Office to the respective wardens or sheriffs
concerned.
JACOB M. GOODYEAR.Carlisle, Pa.
